The Phenomenon of God

    Kenan Osborne argues, in Heideggerian terms, that the human Jesus is an 'appearance' of God. For Heidegger, 'appearance' is contrasted to 'phenomenon.' Now, in an appearance, some thing, y, shows itself as an indication of some other thing, x, which does not and cannot show itself. This would be something like the observable symptoms of a hypothetical disease which could never itself be observed. In the appearance, the invisible x shows itself in the visible y. In the phenomenon, on the other hand, x shows itself in itself – it makes itself manifest and visible, without the use of some other mediating thing. Of course, a thing does not manifest all aspects of itself all at once: for instance, you can never see all six sides of a cube. The phenomenon includes aspects both manifest and hidden.

    In order to maintain the integrity of divinization and revelation, Jesus must be considered a phenomenon rather than an appearance. If Jesus is merely the appearance of a God who he is not, then the Word has not become flesh radically enough to save. In that wonderful exchange extolled by the Fathers, God has become human in order that humanity may become divine. If we are to partake in God's nature, then God must first become human in such a way that we be able to say that Jesus is God. Moreover, if Jesus cannot said to be God, then the revelatory power of the life of Christ has, at best, only a quantitative superiority over other revelation. Only the unity of the is can secure the qualitative difference required for Christ to be the definitive word about God. But this means that Jesus cannot be a mere appearance in which God is made manifest. Jesus is the event of God's self-manifestation in God's self – the divine self to which the humanity is now joined – and is therefore not the appearance but the phenomenon of God.